Defining hypnosis: The pitfalls of prioritizing spontaneous experience over response to suggestion by Terhune, Devin Blair
m
br
.j
ou
rn
al
ho
st
in
g.
uc
al
ga
ry
.c
a 
| E
IS
SN
 1
92
5-
16
88
115 || MBR || Volume : 2 || Issue : 2
commentary
Defining Hypnosis: The Pitfalls of Prioritizing Sponta-
neous Experience Over Response to Suggestion
Theoretical disagreements regarding the 
mechanisms subserving hypnotic respond-
ing have long permeated definitions of hyp-
nosis.  This has led to somewhat cumbersome 
definitions, as highlighted by Wagstaff (this 
issue) in his target article.  Wagstaff attempts 
to bring clarity to this discussion by proffer-
ing a definition of hypnosis that attempts to 
preserve the etymological origin of this term 
whilst maintaining neutrality regarding dif-
ferent theoretical positions.  Here I argue 
that his definitional framework still possess-
es a number of limitations and that hypnosis 
is better defined in a procedural manner.
The absence of a definition that is agreed 
upon by hypnosis researchers has significant 
consequences for experimental hypnosis re-
search and thus advancing such a definition 
represents an important endeavor (Kirsch et 
al., 2011).  By discussing both lay and scien-
tific definitions of hypnosis, Wagstaff (this 
issue) seems to be confused about the type of 
definition we are concerned with here.  If we 
want a natural language definition of hypno-
sis, then we can simply look to how the term 
is used in the general public and be done 
with it.  In contrast, as scientists, we seek a 
formal definition.  Accordingly, by and large, 
we need not concern ourselves with the nat-
ural language usage of the term hypnosis nor 
should our formal definition be constrained 
by the term’s etymological origins†.  In ad-
dition to being sufficiently neutral so as to 
appeal to the majority of scientists, a defini-
tion must also not promulgate conceptual 
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confusion regarding hypnosis and should be 
based on the soundest empirical foundation 
available.  Although Wagstaff makes a strong 
attempt to define hypnosis in a neutral man-
ner, it is on the latter two criteria that his defi-
nition falls short.
My disagreement with Wagstaff’s (this is-
sue) definition hinges on his beliefs regarding 
the core feature of hypnosis.  Wagstaff high-
lights the perennial debate regarding wheth-
er it is the spontaneous experiential response 
to an induction or an individual’s responsive-
ness to suggestion.  His definition attempts 
to sidestep this issue but by prioritizing spon-
taneous experiences over response to sugges-
tion, it ultimately sides with the former.  This 
prioritization has a number of serious limita-
tions but here I highlight two that are espe-
cially significant.  
The first limitation of Wagstaff’s (this is-
sue) definition is that its retention of state 
language invites complications regarding 
whether someone was or was not in hyp-
nosis or was or was not hypnotized and the 
criteria for demarcating between these op-
tions.  According to his definition, whether 
someone is in hypnosis is determined on the 
basis of whether the person accepts or does 
not accept a suggestion that she or he is in 
hypnosis (I am ignoring the altered state 
of consciousness criterion because there 
is no agreed upon way of evaluating this). 
Elsewhere, Wagstaff claims that if a partici-
pant responds to hypnotic suggestions, “it 
is generally inferred that hypnosis has been 
Commentary: On the Centrality of the Concept of an Altered State to Definitions of 
Hypnosis.
† Wagstaff’s (this issue) 
appeals to etymology are 
somewhat puzzling given 
that he advocates abandon-
ing all reference to sleep 
(hypnos).
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induced” (p.  104).  However, these criteria 
are dissociable: a participant may respond 
to suggestions following a hypnotic induc-
tion, but not accept that they are hypnotized 
(this is often observed with low suggestible 
participants).  Wagstaff resolves this con-
flict by prioritizing the criterion of accepting 
that one is hypnotized.  That is, one’s spon-
taneous experiences, which typically inform 
one’s interpretation of whether or not one 
is hypnotized, are more fundamental than 
one’s response to suggestions.  
I maintain that it is highly problematic to 
base demarcation criteria for hypnosis on the 
idiosyncratic interpretations of participants. 
Hypnotic inductions do not produce uniform 
changes in spontaneous experience across, 
nor within, levels of hypnotic suggestibility 
(Pekala & Kumar, 2007; Terhune & Cardeña, 
2010) and thus spontaneous experiences fol-
lowing an induction do not provide a reliable 
method of determining whether something 
qualifies as hypnosis nor how responsive 
someone is.  The use of the acceptance cri-
terion is similarly problematic for Wagstaff’s 
definition of hypnotizability.  In contrast, 
questions regarding whether or not someone 
was hypnotized do not arise if we shift the 
criteria for adjudicating whether something 
is or is not hypnosis away from participants’ 
experiential responses and toward the actual 
procedure.  Considered within the context of 
a procedural definition, the aforementioned 
example of the participant who is slightly 
responsive to hypnotic suggestions but does 
not believe that s/he was hypnotized indi-
cates that the participant took part in a hyp-
nosis protocol and displayed a certain level 
of hypnotic suggestibility.  There are no com-
plications regarding whether or not the per-
son was hypnotized.  The deeper, and rarely 
stated, point here is that the question wheth-
er someone was or was not in hypnosis does 
not provide valuable information above and 
beyond standardized behavioural and ex-
periential measures of hypnotic suggestibil-
ity.  This question merely serves to distract 
researchers from fundamental questions re-
garding the characteristics and mechanisms 
of hypnosis and we should think twice about 
endorsing definitions that kindle this type of 
question.
A second limitation of Wagstaff’s (this is-
sue) definition of hypnosis is that it prioritiz-
es hypnotic depth measures over standard-
ized measures of hypnotic suggestibility. 
This is puzzling because heightened suggest-
ibility is normally a feature of the hypnotic 
state according to Wagstaff’s definition.  It 
is also highly problematic because, contra 
Wagstaff’s claim to the contrary, hypnotic 
depth measures are actually far inferior to 
measures of hypnotic suggestibility.  The in-
structions for depth reports are overly broad 
and thus it is not clear what participants are 
basing their depth reports on *.  Added to 
this, hypnotic depth is a gross over-simpli-
fication of the panoply of spontaneous ex-
periences that follow a hypnotic induction, 
particularly those in highly suggestible indi-
viduals (Cardeña, 2005).  Relying on a single 
numerical value of an individual’s sponta-
neous experiential response to an induc-
tion is untenable because participants will 
likely differentially weight particular expe-
riential dimensions (e.g., attention, memory, 
time perception; Pekala & Kumar, 2007) 
when computing this value and thus hyp-
notic depth values cannot be meaningfully 
compared across individuals.  One might 
counter that highly suggestible individuals 
reliably report greater depth than their low 
and medium suggestible counterparts (e.g., 
Cardeña, Jonsson, Terhune, & Marcusson-
Clavertz, 2013).  However, this is most likely 
because the former experience more extreme 
responses in particular dimensions than 
the latter (Terhune & Cardeña, 2010) and 
thus will typically compute a higher depth 
value irrespective of the dimension(s) they 
prioritize in their computation.  Despite 
these flaws, Wagstaff argues that conven-
tional measures of hypnotic suggestibility 
(see Woody & Barnier, 2008) are “less ac-
curate” (p. 103, Box 1) than depth reports 
and are best considered as proxy measures 
of hypnotizability.  This conclusion does not 
follow from the data he cites†.  Measures of 
hypnotic depth are at present too flawed to 
provide a sound basis for understanding in-
dividual differences in response to hypnosis. 
A definition of hypnosis that prioritizes such 
measures over response to suggestion is sim-
ilarly flawed.
* For example, Wagstaff 
et al.’s (2008) instructions 
for depth reports make 
reference to subjective 
states, to sleep, an especially 
unhelpful analogy, and one’s 
response expectancies.
† For evidence of this 
claim, Wagstaff (this issue) 
cites a study (N=20; Wag-
staff, Cole, & Brunas-Wag-
staff, 2008) that found that 
raw posthypnotic amnesia 
scores (total number of 
items recalled) corre-
lated more strongly with a 
measure of hypnotic depth, 
r=-.59, p<.01, than SHSS:A 
(Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 
1959) scores (excluding 
posthypnotic amnesia), 
r=-.39, p>.08. This looks 
like selective reporting. 
In the same study, the 
authors found that standard 
posthypnotic amnesia scores 
(three or fewer items re-
called [responsive] or more 
than three recalled [non-
responsive]) correlated simi-
larly with hypnotic depth, 
r=.65, p<.01, and SHSS:A 
scores, r=.60, p<.01. Even 
more problematic though 
is the fact that the authors 
did not incorporate revers-
ibility of amnesia into the 
measures of posthypnotic 
amnesia (Kihlstrom & Reg-
ister, 1984) and thus, both 
measures conflate response 
to the amnesia suggestion 
with normal forgetting 
following the de-induction, 
rendering the meaning of 
these correlations ambigu-
ous. What is clear however 
is that neither pair of corre-
lations actually differs, raw 
posthypnotic amnesia (depth 
vs. SHSS:A): 95% CIs=-
0.60,0.18, and standard 
posthypnotic amnesia (depth 
vs. SHSS:A): 95% CIs=-
.30,.41 (see Zou, 2007). 
Accordingly, this study does 
not provide evidence that 
self-reported depth is a bet-
ter predictor of posthypnotic 
amnesia than responses to 
other hypnotic suggestions. 
Moreover, Barber (1999) ac-
tually placed emphasis upon 
spontaneous posthypnotic 
(...suite next page)
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I would like to close by arguing that a 
more well-grounded approach is to define 
hypnosis in a procedural manner.  According 
to this perspective, hypnosis consists of a set 
of procedures including a hypnotic induc-
tion, intended to modify suggestibility, fol-
lowed by the administration of one or more 
suggestions, intended to measure hypnotic 
suggestibility, modulate a particular psy-
chological phenomenon, or treat a specific 
symptom.  This definition is neutral with 
regard to competing definitions of hypnosis, 
in particular state and non-state positions, 
to the requirements of an induction, as well 
as to the core element(s) of hypnosis.  It also 
avoids confusions regarding whether some-
one was or was not hypnotized or whether 
or not someone has the ability to be hypno-
tized (these questions become meaningless). 
Finally, this definition does not prioritize 
certain measurement methods and thus is 
compatible with a wide array of research ori-
entations.  The term hypnotic suggestibility is 
admittedly only preferred by a minority of 
clinicians and researchers (15%; Christensen, 
2005), but it has the important strength of 
being unequivocal, which cannot be said for 
hypnotizability or hypnotic susceptibility.  I 
hope that future researchers will give greater 
consideration to this perspective.   
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amnesia as a marker of a 
subset of highly suggestible 
individuals, a prediction 
that was not confirmed in 
a recent study (Terhune, 
Cardeña, & Lindgren, 
2011). There is no clear rea-
son to ascribe special status 
to spontaneous or suggested 
posthypnotic amnesia as a 
signature of hypnosis.
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